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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
HEIDI METCALF,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 950429-CA

STEVE WALTON,
Defendant and Appellee.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff-appellant herewith makes and files
her petition for rehearing from the Memorandum
Decision (Not for Publication) of the Court dated
and

filed

September

14,

1995,

and

with

particularity state the points of law and fact
overlooked or misapprehended

by the Court, as

follows:
Argument and authority;
1.

At the pretrial conference on August 31

1994, the parties did not, as the Court suggests
in its said memorandum decision

"agree[] that

appellee would be awarded the marital home subject

1

to all debts and obligations."
minute

entry

was

to

the

The trial court's
effect

that

for

plaintiffs one-half interest in the marital home
she was to receive 11 monthly installments of
$366.67 from defendant. Plaintiff then received a
proposed

judgment

provision.

Being

that
unaware

incorporated
as

this

to whether

the

proposed decree had been entered or not, plaintiff
moved to alter or amend the same to in effect
substitute a provision that the home be sold and
the proceeds distributed equally between plaintiff
and defendant.

On October 31, 1994, at a hearing

on plaintiff's motion to alter and amend, the
trial

court

ruled

that

the

provision

in the

proposed judgment as to payments for plaintiff's
one-half

interest

allowed.
action

in

the

home

would

not

be

In the minute entry evidencing the

of the trial court

at the hearing of

October 31, 1994, the final statement was ". . .
All financial issues reserved."
1994,

the

trial

court

2

On November 14,

entered

findings,

conclusions, and

judgment.

On

its

face the

judgment was final and appealable.

The judgment

did

for

not

reserve

any

issues

future

consideration but in the recitals it was stated
that "[a] subsequent hearing was held on October
31

1994

wherein

the

action

for

divorce

was

bifurcated from the remaining issues."

It would

seem

14 1994

to plaintiff

that

the

November

decree, being a final decree, was the result of
such "bifurcation," if in fact there was one. The
minutes of the October 31 1994 hearing state "All
financial issues reserved," nothing is mentioned
on

the

matter

of

bifurcation

except

in

the

documents that defendant's attorney prepared. And
isn't equity served by each party retaining his
one-half interest in the home property? Also, the
trial court did not "set aside" anything; it
merely dissallowed the payments from defendant for
the quit-claim deed from plaintiff.

The proposed

judgment had not been, and was never entered.
Plaintiff

is unaware of any December

3

30 1994

order. But whatever it provided, the part thereof
quoted

in

the

Court

of

Appeals'

memorandum

decision "[I]ssues other than the granting of the
divorce are bifurcated and set aside for separate
consideration.

These include issues *relating to

property, indebtedness of the parties and such . .
.'", had no effect on the prior, November 14 1994
final decree. And plaintiff did not ask the trial
court to

f,

set aside" anything; by her motion to

alter or amend plaintiff objected to the proposed
judgment which was never entered.

In its final

decree the trial court, it may be assumed, thought
it equitable that each party retain his or her
one-half

interest

in the home which

required

nothing affirmative from the trial court, and
there

were

no

"financial

issues"

requiring

affirmative action of the trial court.

Certainly

it cannot be the case that issues can be inserted
in a cause after the fact [of a final judgment].
The Court of Appeals in its decision states
the record to be that
4

"[b]y her own motion,

appellant

set

aside

the

August

31,

1994,

stipulation of the parties concerning the martital
residence•

This

caused

the

trial

judge

to

separate the granting of the divorce from the
division of property."

Plaintiff did not by

motion "set aside the August 31, 1994 stipulation
of the parties
entirely

. . ."

different;

What

with

the

she argued was
provision

as

initially formulated in force, plaintiff remained
tied to the debt on the house which would inhibit
her ability to contract for other financing in the
future.

She wanted defendant#s agreement that

either the house would be sold and the debt paid,
or he would refinance in a manner to discharge the
existing debt.
to

state

And the Court of Appeals goes

"[t]his

caused

the

trial

judge

on
to

separate the granting of the divorce from the
division of property."

The Court of Appeals

acknowledged that the separation occurred as the
result of a December 30, 1994 order, and this was
well

after the entry of the final decree on

5

November 14, 1994 and therefore ineffective to
accomplish its stated purpose.

Defendant's only

remedy was by appeal of the November 14 1994
decree, or by motion to vacate under URCivP 60(b),
or the trial court to proceed under URCivP 60(a)
to include the allegedly omitted matter in the
November 14, 1994 decree.
2.

The Court of Appeals then states "[f]or

the doctrine

[of res judicata] to apply, the

November

14,

1994, decree

resolved

all

issues

(citations omitted).
that

the

issues."

decree

did

must

between

have
the

finally

parties."

"On its face, it is clear
not

resolve

all

of

the

In order for an issue to be finally

resolved, as the Court requires, is it necessary
that that the court in question affirmatively deal
with the matter at hand; or can it, by leaving
things as they are, accomplish its purpose?

In

this case, then, where the trial court intended
that each party have his or her one-half interest
in the house, for there to be a resolution, must

6

the trial court decree an already vested interest?
In addition, res judicata operates not only on
issues litigated and ruled upon, but also on
issues that could have been litigated but were
not.

Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59

(Utah App. 1993).

If In re Covington, 888 P. 2d

675 (Utah App. 1994) cited by the Court of Appeals
is to the contrary it is not the law in Utah
because it would be in contradiction to Utah
Supreme Court cases some of which are cited in
Schoney, supra.
WHEREFORE,
Memorandum

plantiff-appellant

Decision

(Not

For

prays

that

Official

Publication), liled September 1 4 , 199b, be vacated

and the decree of the trial court appealed herein
reversed.
DATED October 2, 1995.

)6^U^-/h^

—

HEIDI METCALF
Plaintiff-Appellant Pro Se
603 North West Capitol Blvd
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
801 359 2833
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On October 2 1995 true copy of the foregoing
mailed to Gregory Wall, #800 Boston Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.

HEIDI METCALF
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